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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) grants the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the Court of
Appeals.

This Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in

this case on August 31, 1989, based on the statutory authority of
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989). This matter was an appeal
to the Court of Appeals by the Estate of Robert E. Erickson, the
respondent herein, from an order of the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding,
admitting a handwritten document to probate as the holographic
will of Robert E. Erickson, the decedent.

On appeal, the Court

of Appeals reversed the trial court.
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the holographic document which is entirely in dece-

dents handwriting and contains the decedent's handwritten name
in the body of the document satisfy the holographic will requirements of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503, including the requirement that
the holographic will contain the Decedent's "signature?"
2.

Was the issue of whether or not the holographic document

contained the decedent's signature properly before the Court of
Appeals?
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is
reported in Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P. 2d 1085 (Utah App.
1988) and 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1988).

1

CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Ann, §75-2-503 (1978).

Holographic Will:

A will which does not comply with section 75-2502 is valid as a holographic will, whether or
not witnessed, if the signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the
testator.
If there are several holographic
wills in existence with conflicting provisions,
the holographic will which is established by
date or other circumstances to be the will that
was last executed shall control.
If it is
impossible to determine which will was last
executed, the consistent provisions of the
several wills shall be considered valid and the
inconsistent provisions shall be considered
invalid,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is a formal petition for the probate of a handwritten document consisting of three cards as the holographic will of
Robert E. Erickson, the decedent.

The holographic document was

admitted to probate by the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. On appeal, the Utah State
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the
holographic document did not meet the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. §75-2-503 to qualify as a holographic will because the
proponent of the will, Mr. Misaka, had not proved that the
decedent intended his handwritten name contained in the body of
the document to be his signature.
Statement of the Facts
Robert E. Erickson ("decedent") died on June 16, 1983. A will
dated June 9, 1955 was admitted to probate and First Interstate

2

Bank, N.A., was appointed
estate.

(R. 19-22, 26-27).

as personal representative of the
The personal representative of the

estate is the respondent in this matter.

Tatsumi Misaka, the

petitioner herein, filed a petition (R. 70-81) seeking the probate
of a holographic document consisting of three 3" x 5" cards, which
were discovered among the effects of the decedent following the
probate of the prior will (R. 84).
The holographic document, a copy of which is located in the
Appendix, begins as follows:
Last Will & Test
I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I
leave and bequeath to the following persons of
my family and others....
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the first card, in the
middle of a sentence, the writing changes from blue to black ink.
The remainder of the first card and all of the second and third
cards are written in the black ink. Additionally, the underlined
date "8/22/73" was subsequently added to the upper right hand
corner of the first card, as shown by the underlined date being
in black ink and partially covering the letter "L" at the beginning of the words "Last Will & Test."

(3-P).

The holographic

document contains the decedent*s handwritten name in the introductory or exordium clause, but does not contain a signature at its
end.
Under the holographic document, Mr. Misaka is the beneficiary
of a one-half interest in a Park City condominium and is noted as
the owner of a one-fourth interest in the "F. H. Store."
3

(3-P).

Mr, Misaka and the decedent were co-investors and partners prior
to decedent's death (R. 131), and Mr. Misaka had filed a claim
against the estate for an interest in the Park City condominium
and other properties based on the business association between Mr.
Misaka and decedent (R. 75-81), which claim was denied by the
personal representative. The personal representative objected to
the probate of the holographic document (R. 82-83).
At trial, the holographic document was received into evidence
and Mr. Misaka presented expert testimony that the entire holographic document, which includes the name of the decedent in the body
of the document, was in the decedent's handwriting.
The personal representative presented

(R. 143).

evidence regarding the

physical form of the handwritten name of decedent, testamentary
intent, and testamentary capacity. Following the trial, the court
rejected the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order
submitted by the Personal Representative (R. 112-119) and accepted
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 122-125) submitted by Mr. Misaka.

The court found that the holographic

document was entirely in the decedent's handwriting, that the name
of the decedent in the document is the decedent's signature, and
that the decedent intended the holographic document to be his
will. Based on those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
court entered an Order admitting the holographic document to
probate as the will of the decedent.

(R. 120-121).

On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the personal representative raised two points:

Point I, "There was no testamentary
4

intent to have the cards made as the holographic will of the
decedent," and Point II, "The nature of the cards themselves fail
to establish a testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent."

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's

decision on a third issue, finding that Mr. Misaka had failed to
prove that the decedent intended that his handwritten name in the
body of the holographic document be his "signature," and therefore
that Mr, Misaka had failed to meet his burden of establishing
prima facia proof that the holographic document contained the
decedent's signature as required by Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I
The Utah Court of Appeals erroneously found that Mr. Misaka
had failed to meet his burden of proof that the decedent intended
his handwritten name in the holographic document to be his
signature. The location of the handwritten name in the document's
exordium clause, which provides "I Robert E. Erickson do hereby
state that I leave and bequeath . . . " and is located immediately
below the title "Last Will and Test," properly allows an inference
to be drawn that the decedent intended the handwritten name to
authenticate the document and serve as his signature.

The

subsequent dating of the will by the decedent further acts to
adopt the handwritten name as the decedent's signature.
Point II
The personal representative did not properly raise at trial
or on appeal the issue of whether the decedent intended the
5

handwritten name to be his signature.

The two points raised on

appeal were "There was not testamentary intent to have the cards
made as the holographic will of the decedent," and "The nature of
the cards themselves fail to establish a testamentary disposition
of the property of the decedent."

The Court of Appeals was in

error in reversing the trial court based on the issue of whether
the decedent intended the handwritten name to be his signature
when the issue had not been properly raised at trial or on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. MISAKA MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC
DOCUMENT CONTAINS THE DECEDENT'S SIGNATURE.
A.

The Language Of The Holographic Document Establishes The
Decedent*s Intent That His Handwritten Name Be His
Signature.

Title 75 of the Utah Code Ann. is the Utah Uniform Probate
Code, which adopted the Uniform Probate Code for the State of
Utah. See 1975 Laws of Utah, Ch. 150. The execution requirements
for wills under the Utah Uniform Probate Code ("UUPC") are set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-502 and -503

(1978).

Those

sections provide in relevant part as follows: "Except as provided
for holographic wills, . . . every will shall be in writing signed
by the testator . . . and shall be signed by at least two persons
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will."
§75-2-502 (1978).

Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978) provides an

exception to those execution requirements for holographic wills:
6

"A will which does not comply with Section 75-2-502 is valid as
a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and
the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator,"
Neither

§75-2-502 nor

-503 requires

that the testator's

signature appear at the end of the will; in fact, the official
comments to the Uniform Probate Code specifically refute such a
requirement:
There is no requirement that the testator's
signature be at the end of the will; thus, if
he writes his name in the body of the will and
intends it to be his signature, this would
satisfy the statute. The intent is to validate
wills that meet the minimum formalities of the
statute.
Editorial Board Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate
Codec
The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Misaka had failed to prove
that the decedent intended that his handwritten name in the body
of the document be his "signature, " and therefore held that Mr.
Misaka failed to meet his prima facia burden of proof of due
execution.

In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals interpreted the

signature requirement of the Utah statute as requiring an authentication showing the finality of the will:
"A decedent's handwritten name in the body of
the purported holographic will is not, by
itself, prima facia evidence that the document
contains the decedent's signature.
In the
context of section 75-2-503, such a handwritten
name must have been written with the intent
that it operate as an authentication of the
document as a will in order for it to be a
signature. The purpose of our statutory scheme
is to require a course of conduct which assures
that a person's will is reduced to handwriting,
and when handwritten, that the intention is to
7

have the writing take legal effect be indicated
by a signature which records the fact. The
signature requirement shows that the writer
finally approved the writing and meant for it
to be operative as a testamentary instrument."
Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah App.
1988).

The Court based this conclusion on Utah Code Ann. §68-3-

12(2)(r) (Supp. 1989), which defines a signature as "includ[ing]
any name, mark, or sign written with the intent to authenticate
any instrument or writing."
The Court of Appeal's interpretation would be consistent with
a statute requiring that a will be signed at the end, but is
inconsistent with the UUPC and the Editorial Board Comment to
Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code which allow a signature
in the body of the will.

In allowing wills to be signed in the

body, the UUPC implicitly rejects the possible purpose that the
signature act to show the finality of a will.
signed

A will which is

in the body is necessarily signed before the written

language of the will is complete. Thus, the "signature" requirement of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 should not be construed to mean
that the handwritten name must be placed on the will to show a
final approval of the completed document.

Imposing a requirement

of a specific intent that the handwritten name in the body of the
will be put there for the purpose of authenticating the completed
will defeats the legislative intent of allowing a will to be
signed in the body, and also defeats the broad purpose of the
Uniform

Probate Code to

"validate wills whenever possible."

8

General Comment to Part 5, Editorial Board Comment of the Uniform
Probate Code.
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals implies further that the
signature requirement under the UUPC is also intended to protect
against deletions.

"Without more, it is an inadequate guard

against writing being deleted..."

Erickson, 766 P.2d at 1088.

Again, such a purpose is consistent only with a will statute
requiring a signature at the end. The intent of the UUPC to allow
a will to be signed in the body implicitly indicates that the
purposes for the signature requirement do not include safeguarding
the will against deletions, because a signature in the body of the
will does not serve to indicate an absolute ending, as a signature
at the end would.
The Court of Appeals' focus on the lack of an after-the-fact
authentication failed to give proper consideration to the language
in the introductory, or exordium, clause of the will, which places
the handwritten name in a context where an inference can properly
be drawn that the decedent intended the handwritten name as his
signature.

The holographic document

provides

"I Robert E.

Erickson do hereby state that I leave and bequeath . . . " immediately underneath the title "Last Will & Test." The language "do
hereby state" shows the intent of the Testator to validate, or
"authenticate," the will with the handwritten name which immediately precedes those words.

The language in the exordium clause

demonstrates the decedent's understanding of the importance and
legal significance of the document, and further shows the dece9

dentf s operative intent that the document he was preparing serve
as his will.
The courts in other states have recognized a handwritten name
located in an exordium clause is evidence of the decedent's intent
to validate or authenticate the will, and thus acts as a signature-

In Smith v. McDonald, 252 Ark, 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972)

the court validated

the will which began

"I, Julian Leland

Rutherford . . . do hereby make, publish and declare this to be
my last will and testament • . ."

The same court, in Nelson v.

Texarkana Historical Socyy and Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d
882 (1974) found the signature requirement not met where the
testator?s handwritten name only appeared

in the context of

stating that certain property was given in memory of the testator.
The Arkansas court relied heavily on the dissenting opinion of
Justice Traynor in In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d
21 (1952) in distinguishing the cases.
In Bloch, an envelope with writing on both sides was submitted
for probate.

The only place where the decedent's name appeared

was in reference to part of her property in the phrase "Bonds
belonging solely to Helene I. Bloch."

The California Supreme

Court found that the name was properly regarded as placed on the
will with authenticating intent because the instrument disclosed
a testamentary intent and was complete in the sense that the
instrument did everything the decedent intended to do.

Justice

Traynor?s dissent focused on the context in which the handwritten
name appeared in the will, distinguishing between a name in an
10

exordium clause identifying the decedent in relation to the
testamentary act and a name merely identifying property of the
decedent:
"Regardless of where the name may appear in the
instrument, there is always the possibility, of
course, that it was intended as a signature.
The mere existence of that possibility, however, is not enough to permit a reasonable
inference that it was so intended. When the
name is used to identify the decedent as the
author of the alleged will as in Estate of
Kinney, 16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (fI, Anna
Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to my four sisters'), or to identify the
instrument as decedent's will as in Estate of
Brooks, 214 Cal. 138, 4 P.2d 148 (fThis is my
will - Elizabeth Ryan Brooks' ), and in addition
the instrument appears to be a complete testamentary document, it may reasonably be inferred
that the name was placed where it was with the
intention of executing the instrument. In such
cases the name is linked to the alleged testamentary act and the probabilities that it was
intended as a signature are strong.
In the
present case, on the contrary, decedent's name
appears only in the description of her
property."
In determining whether a holographic document is "complete"
the California court has looked at whether the document had been
finished or completed by the testator, not whether a complete
disposition of property has been made. See In re Bloch's Estate,
39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952); In re Kinney's Estate, 16
Cal.2d 50, 104 P. 2d 782 (1940) (will complete if testator appeared
to "have "done everything they intended to do").

Further, in In

re Rowe's Estate, 230 Cal. App. 442, 41 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1964), the
court specifically rejected the argument that a holographic will
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is invalid if it fails to dispose of all of the property of the
decedent.
The present instrument constitutes a completed document under
the California rule.

Nothing in the present document indicates

that the decedent had not "done everything he intended to do," or
that decedent intended to do anything else to finish the will.
The subsequent dating of the will goes further to serve as an
affirmative act of completing

the will.

Thus, the present

holographic document meets the standard set out in Judge Traynorf s
Bloch dissent to allow an inference that the handwritten name was
placed with the intent that it be a signature.

Allowing the

probate of the present holographic document would also be consistent with the decisions of the Arkansas court.
The Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion states that in proper
circumstances a handwritten name in the body of the will could be
written with the intent to be a signature. Erickson, 766 P.2d at
1088, fn. 3.

The two cases cited by the court for that proposi-

tion in addition to Smith v. McDonald also support the probate of
the present holographic document.

Those cases found handwritten

names in the body of the wills to be signatures based solely on
language in the will, similar to the language in the present
holographic document.

See In re Estate of Glass, 165 Cal. App.2d

380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) (signature requirement met where will
provided

,f

This is Louis R. Glass

I wish to Retract my last Will

witch I left my sister Ester Glass now Mrss Zipkin & give my
belongings to my Three Nefeu & Nice . . . .") and Burton v. Bell,
12

380 SoWo 2d 561 (Tex. 1964) (signature requirement met by exordium
clause which provided "That I, Roy Wheeler Bell, of Harris Co. Tex
being of sound disposing mind memory, do hereby make this my last
will & testament, hereby revoking any & all other wills heretofore
made by me").
In In re Estate of Fegley, 42 Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80
(1978), the court addressed the question of whether the testator's
signature is required at the end of a will under Colorado's
version of the Uniform Probate Code, which contains a holographic
will provision identical to the relevant portion of Utah Code Ann.
§75-2-503 (1978). The court held that "the intent of the testator
-- not the location of his name -- is the crucial factor in
determining whether a holographic will has been signed within the
meaning of [the Colorado holographic will statute]."
The court determined

Id. at 81.

that the testator lacked the necessary

testamentary intent that a will have immediate effect because the
holographic document contained the phrase "witness my hand . . .,"
followed by a blank signature space and an attestation clause,
which the court saw as indicating that the testator intended to
sign the will at a later date, and that the testator did not
intend her name in the body of the will to be her signature. The
conclusion of the court in Fegley is not inconsistent with the
probate of the present document because the format of the Fegley
document, which contained a blank signature space followed by an
attestation clause, indicated that the testator intended to take
further action to validate the will.
13

Finding that a will contains a signature in situations where
the handwritten name is in the exordium clause is not contrary to
the general statutory definition of "signature" contained in Utah
Code Ann. §68-3-12(2)(r) (Supp. 1989) that a signature includes
"any name, mark or sign written with the intent to authenticate
any instrument or writing."

The language preceding that defini-

tion provides that "[T]he following definitions shall be observed,
unless the definition would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the
statute." Ld. at §68-3-12(2). By allowing signatures in the body
of a will, the legislature has implicitly approved "authenticating" the writing following a signature in the body of a will.
It is unlikely that any holographic will would contain any
language in the will itself indicating an intent to sign significantly clearer than the language in the present holographic
document.

If the Court of Appeals' decision is upheld, the

legislative intent to allow wills to be signed in the body of the
document will be followed in name only, subject to a standard of
proof regarding intent to sign which is effectively unmeetable.
As the California Supreme Court stated in Estate of Black, 30
Cal.3d 880, 641 P.2d 754 (1982):
If testators are to be encouraged by a statute
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts
should not adopt, upon purely technical reasoning, a construction which would result in
invalidating such wills in half the cases.

14

B.

The Decedent's Subsequent Dating Of The Holographic
Document Adopted The Handwritten Name As A Signature.

In addition to the language in the exordium clause, the
decedent dated the holographic document after it was written,
thereby acknowledging and adopting the handwritten name in the
exordium clause as his signature.

In In re Kinney's Estate, 16

Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940), the California Supreme Court
affirmed the probate of a will which began "I, Anna Leona Graves
Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to my four sisters who were
living in 1923," but was otherwise unsigned.

The court, in

reviewing its prior decisions, stated:
"Whenever it has appeared that a holographic
testamentary instrument was a completed declaration of the decedent's desires, such an
instrument has been admitted to probate although the decedent wrote his name only in the
beginning of the declaration. This has been so
even where there was no expression by the
testator affirmatively adopting the name so
placed as his signature to the will. Completeness alone has been held sufficient evidence of
the adoption of the name so placed as the
authenticating signature of the testator and as
a compliance with the statute which requires
the will to be 'signed1."
The court said that a will was not complete if it appeared from
the instrument that the decedent had not "done everything they
intended to do."

See also Estate of McCarty, 27 Cal. Rptr. 94,

211 Cal. App.2d 23 (1962) (signature adopted by underlining at
later date).

In the present case, the decedent's affirmative act

of subsequently dating of the will goes beyond the standard of
Kinney, and should be treated as adopting the handwritten name as
a signature.
15

C.

Decedent's Intent That The Handwritten Name Be His
Signature Can Be Inferred From The Existence of Testamentary Intent.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion reads into the statute a
specific intent requirement that the testator's handwritten name
be "written with the intent that it operate as an authentication
of the document as a will" to accompany the general intent
requirement that testamentary intent be present.
P.2d at 1088.

Erickson, 766

Reaching the conclusion that a person intended an

entire document, including the handwritten name, to be a will, but
that the will is invalid because no specific intent to sign the
will is shown, is a conclusion that defies the purpose of the UUPC
to validate wills whenever possible. If the handwritten name must
be placed in the will with the specific intent of authenticating
the completed document as a will, then the existence of testamentary intent should allow an inference to be drawn that a name
written in the body of the will was done with the intent that it
be a signature and authenticate the document.

The trial court

found the existence of testamentary intent regarding the holographic document at issue, based on extrinsic evidence as well as the
document itself.

That testamentary intent infers the existence

of the decedent? s intent that his handwritten name was placed in
exordium clause to authenticate the will, especially in light of
the surrounding language in the exordium clause.

16

D.

The Form Of The Holographic Document Does Not Negate The
Decedentf s Signatory Intent.

The Court of Appeals1 Opinion addresses several aspects of
the holographic document which should bear no weight as to either
the issue of whether the will contains a signature or the issue
of testamentary intent. The fact that the will is written on the
unlined side of index cards does not in any way imply a lack of
either intent to sign or testamentary intent.

The relevant

inquiry is what was written, not the material which contains the
writing. The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that immaterial
language

on pre-printed

holographic wills.
App. 1987).

forms can be ignored

in validating

Estate of Fitzgerald, 738 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct.

In the same manner, the use of the lined or the

unlined side of the cards is irrelevant.
The fact that the index cards are not attached to each other
has no bearing on signatory intent or testamentary intent.

This

Court addressed that issue in In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342,
285 P. 299 (1930), stating that several loose or detached sheets
may serve as a will if, as is the present case, the sheets can be
coherently read together as a will and contain nothing out of
harmony with the general conception of a will.

The present

holographic document meets that standard.
The Court of Appeals stated in its Opinion that the nature of
the holographic document suggests that it was "unfinished or
constituted a draft.

In regard to the possibility that the cards

were a "draft," an intent to later prepare a more formal document
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does not preclude or detract from the testator? s intent in regard
to an earlier document.

In re Kuttler's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d

322, 325 P.2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App.
66, 228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); In re Estate of Teubert, 298
S.E.2d 456, 461 (W.Va. 1982).

By allowing laymen to prepare

holographic wills, the Utah statute sets a priority on carrying
out the testatorfs intent rather than on the form of the instrument. Admittedly, the holographic document at issue is crude, but
that crudeness does not bear on the requisites for a valid
holographic will.

The fact that the first card was subsequently

dated indicates that the will was completed.

Nothing in the

holographic document indicates that the decedent intended to take
any further action to complete the will.

The mere fact that the

decedent could have disposed of additional property if he chose
to do so does not support a conclusion that the will is incomplete, especially where decedent's prior will is not revoked by
the holographic document at issue.

Even if the holographic

document was not completed, however, the broad purpose of the UUPC
to validate wills whenever possible should support validating a
will which otherwise meets the statutory requirements.

In the

present case, the clear language of the exordium clause and the
subsequent dating are far better evidence of the testator?s intent
to sign the will than the rough nature of the documents.

18

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL
COURT BASED ON AN ISSUE NOT RAISED ON APPEAL
The Personal Representative did not properly raise the issue
at trial or on appeal of whether the decedent intended his
handwritten name to be his "signature."

As stated by the Court

of Appeals in its Opinion in this case, "the parties and the court
below seem to have focused on the broader issue of whether
decedent intended these cards to be his will . . ., " Erickson, 766
P.2d at 1087, and "[T]he findings and conclusions entered by the
trial court, as well as the appellate briefs for both parties,
fail to distinguish intent for these two different purposes." Id.
at 1087 fn. 2.
At the trial, the Personal Representative of the Estate raised
only the issue that testamentary intent did not exist regarding
the will.

(R-128-175). See specifically the Personal Representa-

tive's argument for dismissal following Mr. Misakafs evidence (R
147-150) and closing argument

(R 171-173).

In arguing that

testamentary intent was lacking, the Personal Representative did
cite In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952)
regarding affixing the signature with intent to authenticate (R148), but did so only as part of his argument that testamentary
intent was lacking.

Bloch's

Estatef s broad holding finding an

intent to sign where the handwritten name was used in describing
property of the decedent actually supports a finding of an intent
to sign in the present case.

Further, while the issue of intent
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to sign was also addressed in the Personal Representative's
discussion of points (R 106-111), that document was filed some 17
days after trial and 12 days after the Court's Order (R 104), and
contained no legal authority on the issue except a citation to the
Annotation at 19 A.L.R.2d 926 (1951).

The Personal Represen-

tative's brief filed with the Court of Appeals addressed directly
only the issue of testamentary intent, while in that discussion
addressing intent to authenticate as part of that overall testamentary intent.
While it is proper for a court on appeal to affirm based on
grounds not raised at the trial level, see Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982), this Court has
repeatedly held that an issue will not be considered for the first
time on appeal in cases where the new issue is raised to reverse
the trial court's decision.

See, e.g., Trayner v. Cushing, 688

P. 2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).

As the Court of Appeals stated in

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987):
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or
reasonably discernable from the pleadings,
affidavits, and exhibits will not be considered."
Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d
835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even if
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they
are not supported by any factual showing or by
the submission of legal authority, they are not
presented for decision.
In the present case, the Personal Representative's failure to
clearly raise the issue of whether the decedent intended his
handwritten name to be his signature falls within the perimeters
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of James v. Preston, and should not have been considered by the
Court of Appeals on appeal*
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1989.

WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

/EN P. JONES
Attorneys fcpr Petitioner,
Tatsumi^Misaka
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APPENDIX

1=

Copy of Court of Appeals' Decision, Estate of Erickson v.
Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1988).

2.

Copy of the Holographic Will of Robert E. Erickson.
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APPENDIX 1

ESTATE OF ERICSSON v. MISAKA

Utah

1085

Ctt«t»7t* PJ4 ISSS (UtafcAp*. IMS)

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert
E. ERICKSON, Deceased, Appellant,
T.

Tatsumi MISAKA, Respondent
No. 880139-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 23, 1988.
A petition for probate of three handwritten three-inch by five-inch cards as decedent's holographic will was filed. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
John A. Rolrich, J., admitted the cards to
probate, and personal representative appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that there was no evidence that decedent's name was written in the introductory clause on one card with the intent that it
constitute authentication of one or all of
the cards as a will.
Final judgment and order vacated.
1. Wills *»133
Decedent"8 intent is crucial factor in
determining whether purported holographic will has been signed within meaning of
statute pertaining to execution of wills.
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503.
2. Wills *»130, 131
Although statutory requirements for
execution of valid holographic wills are
minimal, statute Is mandatory and not directory; holographic document is invalid as
will-despite deceased's clear intent that document will be will-uniess document complies with governing statute. U.C.A.1953,
75-2-503.
3. Wills *»133
Decedent's handwritten name in body
of purported holographic will is not, by
itself, prima facie evidence that document
contains decedent's signature; handwritten
name must have been written with intent
that it operate as authentication of document as will in order for it to be signature. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2Xr), 75-2-503.

fflM
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4 Wfce-133
^hree handwritten three-inch by fiveinen cards were inadmissible as holograph
wiil despite fact that decedent's name was
written in introductory clause on one card;
there was no evidence that decedent's
name was written with intent that it constitute authentication of one or all of cards as
will. U.CJU953, 75-2-503.
5. Wills *»133
It is possible for handwritten name at
beginning of body of will to be written with
intent that it be requisite signature, but
there must be support in evidence for that
intent
Randy S. Ludlow (argued), Salt Lake
City, for appellant
HerscheU J. Saperstein, Ken P. Jones
(argued), Watiris* and Campbell, Salt Lake
City, for respondent
Before GAKFF, BILLINGS and
JACKSON, JJ.
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert E. Enckson died in June 1963.
His forma* wffl, executed June 9,1955, was
admitted to probate in July 1988 and the
designated personal representative appointe d In October 1986, respondent Tataumi
Misaka ffled a petition for probate of three
handwritten 3* x 5* cards as Erickson's
holographic wilL In this appeal, the personal representative challenges the trial
court's admission of the cards to probate.
Because we conclude there is insufficient
evidsoce that Erickson intended his handwritten name on one of the cards to be his
signature for purposes of Utah Code Ann.
f 75-2-603 (1978), we vacate the final order and judgment below.

In re Woleott's Estate, 54 Utah 165, 180 P.
169 (1919). The introductory Editorial
Board Comment to Part 5 of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code,1 Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-2-501 through -513 (1978), notes
that its provisions are intended to validate
a will whenever possible. This goal is
achieved, in part, by keeping the formalities for a written and attested will to a
minimum, see section 75-2-502, and by authorizing holographic wills written and
signed by the testator
A will which does not comply with
section 75-2-502 [requiring, among other
things, the signatures of two witnesses]
is valid as a holographic will, whether or
not witnessed, if the signature and the
material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1978) (emphasis added). As the Editorial Board Comment to section 75-2-502 makes dear, the
requisite signature need not be at the end
of a will If the testator "writes his name
in the body of the will and intends it to be
his signature, this would satisfy the statute." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the decedent's intent is the crucial factor in determining whether a purported holographic
will has been signed within the meaning of
section 75-2-503. See In re Estate ofFegley, 42 ColoJtpp. 47, 589 P 2d 80, 81 (1978)
(construing identical statute).

[1] The right to dispose of property by
will is governed and controlled by statute.

[2] Although the statutory requirements for execution of a valid holographic
will are minimal, the statute is mandatory
and not directory. A holographic document is invalid as a will—despite the deceased's clear intent that the document be
a will—unless the document complies with
the governing statute. In Re Woleott's
Estate, 180 P. at 170 (decided under prior
statute requiring holographic will to be entirely written, dated, and signed by testa-

i. The iMue presented in this appeal in one of
fir* iinpression in this state. Utah is one of
sixteen states to adopt all or part of the Uniform
Probate Code since 1972. See Utah Code Ann.
S§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101 (1978) (effective July
1. 1977). Tne others are: Alaska (1973); Arizt>
na(1974); Colorado (1974); Florida (1975); Hawaii (1976k Idaho (1972); Kentucky (1976)

(only Art. VU, Part 1); Maine (1981); Michigan
(1979); Minnesota (1975); Montana (1975); Nebraska (1977); New Mexico (1976); North Dakota (1975); and South Carolina (1987). Due to
the recency of adoption by only a small minority of states, there is a dearth of case law construing the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code.
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at 1378 Blaise Ave. or Maaaka] My interest in
tor). Sm 2 Puge an the Law of Wille home
until she remarries, after Nevada Scratch to Go to
$ 20.4 (W.^Boos t D. Parker ed. 1960). which the
home shall be
Dorothy in Total
sold • lh go to her • V< to
Under UBfch Code Ann. 9 75-3-407 REE Jr. • V« to Sheryl
(1978), proponents of wills in contested Ana Ehekaon
My Insurance to cover my
cases always have the burden ot establishinterest in the floiladay
store to go to Dorothy in
ing prima facie proof of their due execuTotal—460,000 or more.
tion, while contestants bear the burden of
other stock interestsSome Zaoos Utah Bank
establishing lack of testamentary intent
[Craft or Croft] to go To
See In re Estate of Olschansky, 735 P.2d
Sheryl +. Bobby Share +
Share alike
927, 929 (1987).

The proof in support of probate must be
sufficient to convince the court that the
paper produced is the lawful will of the
testator.
A prima facie case is made when it is
shown that all the requirements of law
have been observed in tfce execution of
the will, and unless such prima facie case
is made the court should refuse probate
even where probate is not contested. G.
Thompson, The Law of Wills, 3rd Ed.,
9 199.
In re Estate of Cmddock, 179 Mont 74,
586 P.2d 292, 294 (1978) (proponent failed
to establish prima facie case that purported
holographic will was written entirely by
testator, as required by statute).
Applying these principles to the instant
case, it was respondent Misaka's burden to
make a prima facie showing that the purported holographic will contained the "signature" required by section 75-2-608. On
this issue, respondent introduced only the
three unnumbered and unattached cards,
which were apparently discovered in a desk
drawer along with other belongings of decedent They read as follows, with unreadable portions indicated:
8/22/7$ Lift W01 + Teat I
Robert E. Erieksoado
hereby stats that I leave
and tiuiaafi to the following p i w of my family + other* as my demiae
I f i a t to Jeeve to my wifo
Dorothy

the P.H. Store shall go V«
to Dorothy V4 to REE
Jr y« to Sheryl [unreadabk] the other Vi ia owned
by T. Miaaka The condominium at Park City ia to
go To Vi REE Jr Y< to
Sheryl + W T T [Madaka

2. The findinft and conclusions entered by the
trisi court as well as the appellate briefs of both
parties, fail to ^«H«f»««h "intent" for these two
different purposes. The distinction is pointed
out in Note, Wills—Validity of Signature for
Holographic Wills, 23 Ark.URev. 521 (1975). discussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y and
Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 (1974),
and Smith v. MeeDoneU 252 Ark. 931, 4S1

On the basis of these writings, respondent Misaka is churning a one-half interest
in Erickson's Park City condominium.
Without admission of the index cards to
probate as a valid holographic will, Misaka
takes nothing; the distribution of the property is controlled by the terms of Erickson's formal 1956 wilL
Although the parties and the court below
seem to have focused on the broader issue
of whether decedent intended these cards
to be a will, the relevant inquiry is whether
the evidence is sufficient to show decedent
Erickson intended that his handwritten
name near the top one of the cards be his
signature.2 Misaka offered no evidence extrinsic to the cards themselves as proof of
Erickson's intent The trial court concluded the three index cards contained the "signature" required by section 75-2-503 for a
valid holographic will, without specifying
the particulars in the three cards relied on
to implicitly find that Erickson intended his
handwritten name to be his signature.
This determination of the decedent's intent,
based solely on the trial court's examination of the purported will, is a matter of
law, see In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342,
285 P. 299 (1930), which we review on appeal under a correction-of-error standard.
Western Kane County Special Serv. DisL
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1378 (Utah 1987).
[3] In the definitions provided by the
legislature to guide construction of Utah
S.W.2d 741 (1972). In Nelson, as in this
the evidence extrinsic to the purported will itself
went only to the question of general testamentary intent, i.e.. did the decedent intend the writing to be a will not to whether she intended her
name in the body of the instrument to be her
signature. Nelson, 257 Ark. at 398, 516 S.W^d
at SS4.
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,),iMg^ililM
- j , defined M ^ ^ d .
inff ^ m ^ mark, or sign written with
the mini to authenticate any instrument
or
writing/'
Utah
Code Ann.
f 68-3-12(2)l» (1988). A decedent's handwritten name in the body of the purported
holographic will is not, by itself, prima
facie evidence that the document contains
the decedent's signature. In the context of
section 75-2-503, such a handwritten name
must have been written with the intent that
it operate as an authentication of the document as a will in order for it to be a
signature. The purpose of our statutory
scheme is to require a course of conduct
which assures that a person's will is reduced to writing and, when handwritten,
that the intention to have the writing take
legal effect be indicated by a signature
which records that fact The signature
requirement shows that the writer finally
approved the writing and meant for it to be
operative as a testamentary instrument
See Mechem, The Rule in Lemayne v.
SUmI**, 29 Mich.LRev 685, 690-96 (1931).
[41 Our review of the purported holographic will in this case leads us to conclude that it does not contain the signature
required by the statute before it can be
admitted to probate. The three cards in
evidence are index cards on which only the
unMned sides have been written. They
were not attached to each other. There is
no concluding language on any of the
cards, and they otherwise give no indication that they are, taken together, a completed document Indeed, the nature of the
note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of
punctuation, and the perfunctory, open-ended wording strongly suggest that the
cardans* a document are unfinished or
rtinslHiittt a draft
Although the handwritten name of the
decedaat appears in the phrase "I Robert

E. Erickson do hereby state/' the writing
contains nothing indicating the name was
intended as the required executing signature. There is nothing on the face of the
cards to affirmatively or by necessary implication suggest that decedent wrote his
name for any other purpose than to identify himself as the writer. See In re Bernard's Estate, 197 CaL 36, 239 P. 404
(1925); see generally, Annotation, Place of
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L
R.2d 926, 939-44 (1951). In short, there is
no evidence that decedent's name was written in the introductory clause on one card
with the intent that it constitute authentication of one or all of the cards as a will.
Respondent therefore, failed to make a
prima facie showing that the purported
holographic will contained the authenticating signature required by section 7&-2-603.
[5] It is, of course, possible for a handwritten name at the beginning of the body
of a will to be written with the intent that
it be the requisite signature.3 However,
there must be support in the evidence for
that intent Standing alone, it is equivocal,
leaving the decedent's final approval and
authentication of the writing in doubt
Without more, it is an inadequate guard
against writing being deleted, a possibility
in this case if additional cards were written
upon by Erickson only to be lost misplaced, or discarded by him or others.
The final judgment and order of the trial
court admitting the cards to probate as
decedent's holographic will is vacated.
Costs to appellant
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

3L £ * , Smith v. MacDonabL 252 Ark. 931. 4S1
(1925) (no intent that name in exordium be
SoWJtd 741 (1972) (handwritten name in title
signature where document terminated abruptly
and exordium clause constitutes signature reafter a specific bequest); Estate of Fegley, 42
quired by statute); In re Estate of Glass. 165
Colo-App. 47, 5S9 P.2d SO (1978) (phrase at end
CaLAppJd 330, 331 ?2d 1045 (195S) (handwritof instrument "witness my hand ..." followed
ten name in ****A\f\% of document. This is by blank signature space indicates decedent inLouis R. Glass"); Burton v. Bell 380 S.WJd 561
tended to sign later and did not intend hand(Tex.1964) (handwritten name in exordium
written name in exordium clause to be her
dause, "That I Roy Wheeler Bell
"is signasignature); Davis v. Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 207 P.
ture required for holographic will). But see In
1065 (1922) (same phrase and result as Feeiey).
re Bernards Estate, 197 CaL 36. 239 P. 404
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